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1. Introduction
Beta ( ) of the Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) has, over the years, been used for judging organisational
performance. As Harrington (1983, p. 157) notes in the Harvard Business
Review: “One way to quantify financial risk is via the capital asset pricing
model, which describes the way stock markets establish prices, which in
turn establish the returns on corporate capital investment.”
Harrington then describes the way that Alaska Interstate, Inc. used   to
made decisions about the direction that the company should take to better
manage their return relative to risk. Also see, Beneda (2003) who discusses
the use of   in determining the cost of capital and the use of that informa-
tion for deciding about changing the asset/project base of the organisation.
These two examples, underscore the following fundamental economic im-
perative: It is in the best interest of the firm to manage their return/risk
relationship because (1) the more the market relative risk the more the or-
ganisation is expected to return, and (2) the nature of the return-relative-
-to-risk relationship impacts the interest rate that the firm can negotiate
in the long-term capital market as well as the amount that is needed to be
committed for the payment of dividends (Brealey – Myers – Allen, 2006,
pp. 418–421). For these reasons, there has been considerable interest in exa-
mining this simple regression multiplier to determine what seem to be
drivers of   – i.e., the variables over which management has control which
in turn affect  .
Arnold (2002, p. 741) identifies the following two factors as drivers for
the return/risk relationship:
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with variable costs of production its profits are highly sensitive to out-
put levels. [...] The higher variability in profit means that a higher beta
should be allocated.
2. Degree of financial gearing. If the company has high borrowings, with
a concomitant requirement to pay interest regularly, then profits attri-
butable to shareholders are likely to be more vulnerable to shocks. So
the beta will rise if the company has higher financial gearing (or leverage).
The implication of Arnold’s conjectures is clear. Considering the classical
theoretical underpinnings of thereturn/risk relationship, he suggests that Ope-
rating and Financial gearing should be positive “drivers” for  . This then is
the motivation of our study. We address the question: Are the positive rela-
tionships suggested respecting operating and financial gearing, as they relate
to  , reliable decision information for those seeking to manage the firm’s re-
turn/risk relationship by managing   through these gearing variables?
2. Study
To examine the relationship of Operating Gearing and Financial Gearing
to  , we have selected as the measurement surrogate for operating gearing
the ratio of net Property, Plant and Equipment to Total Assets (PPE/TA),
or what Weill (2004) terms Tangibility, and for financial gearing, we will
use the ratio of Long-Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity (LTD/E) which is
the usual definition of leverage. Consider now the study sampling frame,
time periods, accrual criteria and data sources.
The Study Sampling Frame: It has been recognised for some 30 years
that firm size and relative value interact with   and that the nature of that
interaction has been changing over time (Fama – MacBeth, 1973), (Beneda,
2003). So that we could focus most clearly on the effects of gearing on  , we
wanted to find a sampling frame where   would not be differentially af-
fected by firm size and value. This was thesame issue that Fama and French
(1993) faced in developing their three-factor model. Therefore, in consider-
ing the traditional one-factor model using the S&P 500 or the three-factor
model, one parameter of which is the comparable equity  , we selected
the one-factor model because (1) recent sensitivity analyses reported by
Hendricks and Singhal (2001) on the S&P 500 as it relates to the one- and
three-factor models as benchmarks suggest that either can be usefully em-
ployed in understanding long-run stock price performance, and (2) the equi-
ty   of the one-factor model is the traditional benchmark and is simple to
interpret in that it contains all the multiplier information. Finally, because
  may be changing over time, we selected firms that have been on
the S&P 500 continually for a long period of time so that we could focus
most clearly on effects of the gearing variables on   by controlling for
the time frame. Consider now the selected time periods.
The Time Periods: Our analysis uses market and firm data from the be-
ginning of 1985 until the end of 2002. During this time period, the follow-
ing three major events have affected the commercial world: (1) worldwide
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ket implications of Enron’s collapse, started by Jeff Skilling’s unexpected
resignation due to “personal reasons” on 15 August 2001; and (3) the ter-
rorist attack on 11 September 2001 resulting in the collapse of the twin tow-
ers of the World Trade Center. To control for the economic shocks that these
events created, we divided the time span of our study into three periods:
Pre-Internet (1985–1992), Internet (1993–August 2001), and Post-Enron
and 9/11(September 2001–2002), noted as Post-9/11. These time periods also
give a reasonable time frame for the measurement of  , which according to
Ibbotson Associates, CompustatTM and Value LineTM, is often based on at
least a five-year period. Our study, then, can speak most clearly to the ques-
tion of   associations for the two gearing variables for the first two time
periods; the third time period, Post-9/11 which spans only 16 months, is of-
fered as exploratory information.
A caveat here is appropriate. Many events have dramatically affected all
major indices – e.g., the S&P 500, the NASDAQ, and the NYSE – and pos-
sibly have affected them differentially depending upon their sectoral con-
stitution. In our analysis, we have aggregated over all the various sectors
that in total constitute our market index. Here, as further research, awithin-
-index major sector analysis is suggested to examine if benchmarking on
particular sectors within the market index may refine our over-sector re-
sults. See Khorana and Nelling (1997) who do this sector screening for
the S&P 500 and determine, not surprisingly, that sometimes sectors are
important analytic partitions. Also see (Ibbotson Associates, 2004, p. 100).
Accrual Criteria: We have selected as the sample of organisations those
that satisfied all the following three criteria:
1. They were on the S&P500 continuously from 1 January 1985 until 31 De-
cember 2002.
2. They had quarterly, downloadable gearing performance information.
3. They had not undergone a redefinition of line-of-business, nor merged
nor partnered that resulted in a change in their stock listing symbol.
Of the 165 organisations for which complete market data was available,
22 organisations satisfied the first two accrual criteria, but were eliminated
owing to the third. We used the third criterion to focus our analysis on
the “same” organisation. We assumed that stock listing symbol changes
would, at minimum, induce some perturbation in   compared to organisa-
tions that maintained the same symbol. For example, Monsanto was elimi-
nated from thestudy because Pharmacia and Upjohn merged with Monsanto
in 2000, at which time Monsanto’s symbol changed from MTC to MON. Fur-
ther, because   is expressed through the OLS linear one-factor regression
model, one must be attentive to the assumptions underlying this regression
model. Here we used, as a model adequacy check, the Fisher’s Kappa’s
p-value of the residuals generated by the linear regression. Any company for
which the Fisher’s Kappa’s p-value was less than 0.01, indicating that the li-
near fit left important structure in the residuals and so   was not well esti-
mated, was eliminated from the study. Nine companies were eliminated for
this reason. Further, for each of the three time periods, we eliminated any
firms which, for that time period, had on average negative equity. We view
negative equity as an exceptional event, not in the general spirit of the fi-
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than two organisations being eliminated for any particular time period. Fi-
nally, because we are examining the correlation of  , PPE/TA and LTD/E,
we screened out any organisations that were identified as Malhalanobis out-
liers due to the possible skewing effect such “correlation” outliers can have
on the estimation of   (Sall – Creighton – Lehman, 2005). This resulted in
the following number of organisations in the final samples: Pre-Internet
[n = 129], Internet [n = 129] and Post-9/11 [n = 124].
We tested if there was bias in these eliminations by examining the study
organisations compared to approximately 35 organisations eliminated on:
Total Sales as well as their Fortune 500 rank. For both variables, there were
no statistically significant differences between the two groups at a p-value
< 0.1. Also, for the Fortune 500 rank, the 95-percent confidence interval for
both groups contained 250. This information suggests that was no syste-
matic bias in the firms eliminated.
Data Sources: We collected through the Wharton Research Data Ser-
vices (WRDSTM) the following information:
1. From the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSPTM), we collected
daily return information from 1 January 1985 to 31 December 2002 for
the study organisations, and time-matched S&P 500 value-weighted re-
turns, our market surrogate.
2. From CompustatTM, we collected quarterly Net Property Plant and Equip-
ment (PPE), Total Assets (TA), Long Term Debt (LTD) and Equity (E),
Current Assets (CA), Current Liabilities (CL), Net Operating Profit af-
ter Taxes (NOPAT), and Earnings per Share (EPS).
3. Results
Sample Credibility Check: Here we want to give three expectations 
for    as a credibility check on the sample of organisations relative to
the sampling frame:
1. For organisations with more than 15 years of continuous representation
on the S&P 500 index, we expect that they would have, on average,   less
than 1, the assumed market  . This expectation seems reasonable given
the distributions of   reported by BVD: OSIRISTM where the average  
for all the firms on the NYSE for 2004 was 1.04.
2. One would expect that   for the Internet period would be lower than   for
the Pre-Internet period. This is due to the rapidly increasing index value
added by the newly created “sector” of Internet companies, sometimes re-
ferred to as the dot.com bubble. In comparison, the stocks of our sample
would have lost some of their multiplier value due to their lack of syste-
matic co-variation with thedot.com sector (Eleswarapu – Reinganum, 2004).
3. Also, we expect that the correlation of   at the firm level would be sta-
tistically significant on a period-by-period basis. This is due to the na-
ture of the firms in our sample which are relatively stable in that they
are long-term members of the S&P 500 and so one would be surprised if
there were no association on a period by period basis.
Consider now the study results relative to these expectations.
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All of the 95-percent confidence intervals for   exclude 1.0, suggesting
that for each time period, this population of firms has a   of less than 1.0.
Using the Tukey-Kramer HSD multiple comparison test, here a conserva-
tive test of our second expectation, we find that all of the three means are
statistically different from each other at   = 0.05. Therefore, our expecta-
tion that   for the Internet period would be lower than   for the Pre-Inter-
net period is borne out by thedata. In Table1 we have presented both means
and medians, subsequently, we will present medians and use, for purposes
of inference, the Median test that conserves sample size in the presence of
outliers that were in evidence for some of financial performance data. 
As for the third expectation, the results are presented in Table 2. The p-va-
lues for these correlations, considering the null, are all less than 0.0001 sug-
gesting that the firm  s are indeed associated over time. Also, the lowest
pair-wise correlation is for the Pre-Internet with the Post-9/11 suggesting
that the association between the two temporal extremes is the lowest which
is not unexpected. In Table 2, we presented both Pearson and Spearman
correlation coefficients; subsequently, to present conservatively the associ-
ational results, we will use the Spearman correlation coefficients and the re-
lated p-values. Finally, for informational purposes, we wish to note that
the correlation of the PPE/TAwith LTD/E was positive and statistically sig-
nificant p < 0.0001 as was the case for almost all of the studies that we re-
viewed. For an excellent summary of studies that report on this relation-
ship, see (Weill, 2004).
Tables 1 and 2 and the testing information of the three expectations ar-
gue that the data relationships for   seem reasonable for the organisations
in our sampling frame, suggesting that our sampled firms may provide re-
liable information respecting the  -driver analysis. Consider now the  -Gea-
ring relationships.
4. Gearing and Arnold’s Conjecture:   as It Relates to PPE/TA and
LTD/E
Considering Arnold’s expectations, we hypothesize that the correlation
of   with the two gearing variables would be positive for each of the three
time periods. These results are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
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TABLE 1   Profiles for the Three Study Time Periods
Study variables Pre-Internet (n =129) Internet (n =129) Post-9/11 (n = 124)
Mean (Median) 0.74 (0.78) 0.52 (0.53) 0.68 (0.71)
Range (St. Dev.) 0.22 to 1.23 (0.22) 0.22 to 0.98 (0.16) 0.26 to 1.30 (0.22)
TABLE 2   Period Multivariate Correlations: Pearson (Spearman)
Pre-Internet Internet
Internet 0.63(0.56) –
Post-9/11 0.39(0.35) 0.78(0.77)The results are clear; the correlations of   with the two gearing variables
are consistently negative meaning that one may reject Arnold’s conjecture
that   is positively associated with Operating and Financial Gearing. We
call these the Gearing Inversions.
Discussion: These Gearing Inversions, where   is negatively associated
with Operating and Financial Gearing, work against the accepted theory
as expressed by Arnold’s conjecture that is founded on the Markowitz (1952)
assumptions regarding the trade-off between return and risk where gear-
ing would be positively associated with  . However, these gearing inver-
sions that we have identified are not a complete surprise and do have eco-
nomic precedent. Ibbotson Associates (2004), for example, reports that for
the telecommunications industry during the 1990s, there was also evidence
of such a  -financial gearing inversion. They note: “The lower debt-to-total-
-capital ratios indicate that there is less leverage and therefore less finan-
cial risk. All else held constant, one would expect the levered beta to fall,
given a reduction in leverage. However, we observed the opposite for
the telecommunications industry in the 1990s.” (p. 100)
This underscores the importance of also considering the possibility that
such effects may vary over sectors as discussed above. We now consider
the Gearing Inversions reported in Tables 3 and 4, to examine, in detail,
what may underlie them and how that may help place Arnold’s conjecture
in context.
5. Financial Profiling of the Inversion Groups
In examining these unexpected inversions, we noticed the similarity of
our results to that of Weill’s study of transitional economies in which he
measured a leverage inversion with respect to financial gearing. After re-
gressing Leverage with several variables, one of which was Tangibility, Weill
observed that: “The coefficient for Tangibility is significantly negative for
all countries. This relationship appears surprising since the role of colla-
teral value is expected to be of the utmost importance in transition coun-
tries where banks exert special care to secure loans. This argument could
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TABLE 3 Correlations of   with Operating Gearing by Period
Time Periods   with PPE/TA p-value
Pre-Internet –0.22 0.0110
Internet –0.51 < 0.0001
Post-9/11 –0.34 < 0.0001
TABLE 4 Correlations of   with Financial Gearing by Period
Time Periods   with LTD/E p-value
Pre-Internet –0.24 0.006
Internet –0.29 0.0014
Post-9/11 –0.18 0.0451however not be relevant for transition countries, as it ignores two features
of these economies. First, the enforcement of the law in case of bankruptcy
and liquidation is less efficient in transition countries than in Western coun-
tries. [...] Secondly, as suggested by Hussain and Nivorozhkin (1997), lenders
in transition countries are particularly risk-adverse and may then attach
great importance to liquidity. As a result, the share of current assets in to-
tal assets should be positively valued, leading to a negative relationship be-
tween tangibility and leverage.” (p. 240)
To examine this liquidity perspective as a way to understand these un-
expected  -Gearing Inversions, we partitioned the sample using median-
-splits as follows:
For each of the three time periods, we grouped the firms into one of the fol-
lowing two inversion groups: Organisations with a low   and with high ope-
rating and high financial gearing. Note this median-split group as (Low-
 HighGearing). The group with a high   and low operating and low finan-
cial gearing is noted as (High LowGearing). There were 21 organisations
in the (Low HighGearing) group and 29 organisations in the (High Low-
Gearing) group.
We reason that this partitioning will give theclearest information for judg-
ing the nature of the  -Gearing Inversion because each group is uniquely
categorized based upon the gearing inversion – i.e. they are, for our sam-
ple, the purest representative profile of the gearing inversion. We then col-
lected, for these organisations, the following information from CompustatTM
for the three periods of the study: the Current Ratio (CR), Net Operating
Profit After Taxes (in millions) (NOPAT) and Earnings per Share (EPS). In
a preliminary analysis, we observed that the financial profiles of the two
inversion groups were not different over the three periods, i.e., the median
level differences and the corresponding p-values for the financial profiles
were the same for each of the three periods. Therefore, we will report the pe-
riod-combined results in Table 5.
Results: We see that the only statistically significant difference between
the Low HighGearing and High LowGearing groups is for the Current Ra-
tio (CR). Note that the   information is not a result; it is an artefact of
the way the gearing groups were formed.
Discussion: Table 5 suggests that there is a strong positive relationship
between   and Liquidity as expressed through the median relationships
for the Current Ratio. This  -liquidity relationship is also unexpected or
surprising in the following sense. According to the standard return/risk
relationships upon which the CAPM is founded, gearing and   should be
positively associated – i.e., more gearing results in less flexibility thus re-
sulting in a higher relative risk to return as measured by  . This rea-
soning extends also to the  -liquidity relationships as follows. One would
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TABLE 5 Financial Profiles for the Inversion Groups
Groups ß p-value CR p-value NOPAT p-value EPS p-value
Low HighGearing 0.39 – 0.86 – 1,276 – 2.3
High LowGearing 0.74 <0.0001 1.48 <0.0001 970 0.62 2.1 0.62theorize that   would be indirectly associated with the current ratio, our
surrogate for liquidity, because increased liquidity, should give to the or-
ganisation more flexibility to take actions in the short run and so result
in a lower   compared to organisations with a less flexible operating pro-
file – i.e., more liquidity suggests more flexibility and so results in
a lower  . Therefore in the standard theory there should be an inverse re-
lationship between liquidity and  . So working either from gearing or li-
quidity, in theory, one expects   to be positively associated with gearing
and inversely associated with liquidity. We find the opposite results for
both: From Table 5, relative to the median relationships for the two gear-
ing groups, we measure an unexpected strong positive  -CR relationship.
In fact, the correlations of   with CR for each of the three periods were
0.5, 0.6, and 0.6 each of which has p-values <0.0001. Further, from Table5,
we see that NOPAT and EPS are not different between the gearing groups,
suggesting that the anomalous inversion effect is isolated on liquidity as
a possible instrumental association with  . An explanation of these un-
expected results may be argued from a behavioural finance perspective
(Kahneman – Riepe, 1998), (Shiller, 2003), (Ackert – Church – Deaves,
2003). This is essentially what Weill does to explain his “surprising” re-
sult.
6. A Behavioural Finance Possibility
For our study, the inverse relationships of operating and financial gear-
ing with  could lie in theway that liquidity is perceived by those in themar-
ket and not with the Markowitz return/risk relationship that would have  
being positively associated with gearing – i.e., theoretically more gearing
and so less liquidity would result in more risk – i.e. a higher   and vice
versa. Perhaps high liquidity suggests to investors that they should ex-
pect/require more return; these high liquidity organisations may seem to
have great potential to react as well as to be pro-active in the complicated
and dynamic globalized markets and so the shares of these companies may
take on the aura of glamour securities (Ciccone – Rocco, 2005).
Arnold (2002, p. 621) suggests that the behavioural aura of glamour com-
panies may result in increased variance of expected returns and also a mol-
lification of these expectations for the not-so-glamorous companies. He says:
“The problem is that the market apparently consistently overprices the ‘gla-
mour’ stocks and goes too far in assigning a high price earnings ratio be-
cause of overemphasis on recent performance, while excessively depress-
ing the share prices of companies with low recent earnings growth.” Also see 
(La Porta – Lakonishok – Shleifer – Vishny, 1997).
Therefore, high-liquidity organisations with a glamour aura may be ex-
pected to have higher returns than organisations with lower liquidity pro-
ducing higher volatility, so   moves positively with liquidity due to the gla-
mour-aura and not inversely as return/risk theory would suggest; and, we
know that gearing is practically inversely related to liquidity resulting in
the inverse relationship that we measure for gearing and   (Eleswarapu –
Reinganum, 2004).
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We learn from Weill’s study of transition economies, that liquidity might
be a key economic hedge given the dynamic, uncertain and evolving mar-
kets. Actually, the need for liquidity as a flexibility-hedge is what we now
see in the globalized markets. Starting in the mid 1980s, in attempts to
guard liquidity, organisations have downsized, outsourced and currently are
partnering and venturing in low-salary-zones as the “en vogue moyen de
survivre” (Dominique, 1999). Therefore, perhaps now and for the foresee-
able future, companies are like the transition countries in that they are fac-
ing dynamic uncertainty in the fast-evolving global markets where a key
driver for survival is liquidity. This would argue for firms, in general, to
take care to manage liquidity – a survival necessity – and insofar as they
need to manage their return/risk profile expressed through  , organisations
must manage their public image so as to downplay their possibility of be-
ing thought of as glamour stocks because the glamour image may work
against the economic logic of having higher liquidity!
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The authors investigated Arnold’s conjecture that Leverage (Financial Gearing)
and Operating Gearing should be positively related to theequity  of theSharpe/Lint-
ner CAPM. They find for a sample of the S&P 500 firms that have been on that in-
dex continuously for more than 15 years, that   is negatively associated with Leve-
rage and Operating Gearing. Using Weill’s results for transitional economies,
the authors suggest that liquidity may provide an explanation for this anomalous 
 -Gearing inversion. The implications are: (1) that one should revaluate the positive
associations posited for Financial and Operating gearing with   and (2) consider
the possibility of managing liquidity as a way to affect  .
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